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Fundamental microphysics has witnessed a considerable shift of the balance between theory and experiment over the last 50 years. The standard model of elementary particle physics, which was theoretically conjectured in 1967 and empirically confirmed in the 1970s and 1980s, attributes a different role to its visible implications than earlier theories in microphysics. The experimental implications of the standard model lack immediate significance within the context of visible phenomena and cannot be exploited technically. Intra-theoretical questions have become more important for the motivation of theory development, which challenges the status of the experimental process as the primary driving force behind scientific progress. This devaluation of the visible phenomena is potentially dangerous for empiricist positions in philosophy of science. If the role of visible phenomena in fundamental physics decreases, philosophical positions which put much emphasis on a privileged role of visible phenomena may look less convincing. The present work will analyse the implications of the particle physics research program for two classical empiricist positions: a discussion of van Fraassen’s constructive empiricism (CE) [van Fraassen 1980, 1985, 2003] will be preceded by a look at straightforward instrumentalism in order to provide a more general understanding of the arguments involved.
Instrumentalism asserts that statements involving invisible objects must not be understood literally but have to be taken as convenient short-cut formulations of statements about visible phenomena. The philosophical posit of a reality beyond the visible phenomena is considered meaningless. CE, to the contrary, takes scientific statements literally and shifts the empiricist claim from an ontological to an epistemological level. It concedes that statements about the invisible regime have a genuine meaning but emphasizes that it is impossible for the scientist ever to test more than the empirical adequacy (EA) of theories about invisible objects. Therefore, CE takes scientists to aim only at EA and not at truth.
At first glance, CE seems to be in a better position to face the developments in particle physics than instrumentalism. By taking statements about the invisible literally, it attributes a significantly higher status to theory and thus might be expected to be able to accommodate the new circumstances. It will be argued in the following that this ad hoc assessment does not bear closer scrutiny. Though CE avoids some of the problems faced by instrumentalism in the context of highly developed theory building, it has serious problems of its own and in some respect fares even worse than instrumentalism. After a characterisation of the altered status of experiment in particle physics in section 2, section 3 will discuss the consequences for instrumentalism. Sections 4 and 5 will address the crucial problem that arises in the context of CE. 


2: The Marginalisation of the Phenomena

The general characteristics of fundamental microphysics today differ substantially from those 50 years ago. In 1950, several aspects of microphysical research could be understood to favour an empiricist stance. On the one hand, quantum physics urgently posed the question whether the realist concept of an external ontological object, which had been inspired by the intuitive grasp of visible reality, could and should be upheld in the new entirely counter-intuitive scientific environment. On the other hand, in spite of their non-intuitive theoretical content, the fundamental microphysical theories were of utmost importance for predictions in the observed world. While the specific experiments designed to test specific qualities of the microphysical theories often relied on subtle and minute phenomenological output, the tested theories as a whole had very substantial visible consequences. These were utilized in technical developments that shaped everyone’s living reality. From the early utilization of X-rays to the building of nuclear bombs and power plants, from the development of television to the use of neutron physics in modern medical treatments, technological progress was and still is based on the fundamental theoretical concepts developed in the first half of the 20th century. 
Under these circumstances, science could easily be motivated by its visible implications. It was plausible to claim that the primary relevance of microphysics lay in its potential to create, control and understand visible phenomena rather than in its posit of some weirdly behaving invisible objects. The argument could be led at two levels. From a utilitarian perspective, it could be asserted that science had actually adopted the role of an auxiliary discipline of the technical evolution and was justified primarily by the technical achievements it made possible. Choosing a more knowledge-oriented perspective, the empiricist could argue that the many significant visible phenomena created by experimenters and technicians constituted an important part of reality and therefore deserved scientific analysis. 
Looking at particle physics today, we find a quite different situation. At the level of experiment, the inverse proportionality law between the kinetic energy per particle and the testable distance scale has provided a straightforward strategy to test ever smaller distance scales by building ever larger particle colliders. At the level of theory, the quest for consistent unified theories of physical forces has led to increasingly complex and predictive theories, whose characteristic length scales lies many orders of magnitude below the scales relevant in traditional nuclear physics. 
These developments have joined in supporting a process I want to call the marginalisation of the phenomena. The significance of the visible phenomena to be described by theoretical schemes has decreased dramatically in modern particle physics. Five interrelated points may be listed to summarize this shift:

1: Particle theory has lost its direct relevance for technological progress. The deep inelastic scattering at high energies that takes place in collider experiments produces highly instable particle states whose life span is far too short to offer any perspective for technical utilisation. The theories tested in these experiments thus don’t have any technological relevance today and there are no indications that this might change in the foreseeable future. 
2: The phenomena to be explained by particle theories acquire their significance solely in the context of those theories. The observed respectively expected phenomenological implications of theories like the particle Standard Model or supersymmetry are limited to a few unusual lines on a set of photos taken in a collider experiment. The specific structure of these lines would remain entirely irrelevant if judged solely in the context of visible phenomena. Their relevance is based entirely on their capability to confirm or refute scientific theories.
3: The experimental effort to produce these phenomena is steadily increasing. Today it requires the multi billion-dollar construction of a many kilometre long particle collider and the sustained work of thousands of experimentalists to test physics at new energy scales. Many theories created today, like grand unified theories or string theory​[1]​, only predict new phenomena whose experimental tests lie far beyond the capability even of the most ambitious experiments imaginable today.
4: The abstractness and complexity of the corresponding theoretical schemes is increasing as well. Theoreticians develop more and more extensive concepts about the structure of the micro-world whose richness stands in stark contrast to the minimalism of their visible implications. 
5: Theory has replaced experiment as the primary driving force of scientific progress. In earlier microphysics, experiments were typically guiding the scientific evolution by their new discoveries. The structure of atoms and nuclei, the existence of a host of new particles, the different types of nuclear interactions or phenomena like CP-violation were first discovered by experiment and described theoretically afterwards. With the discovery of the importance of internal symmetries and the advent of the particle physics standard model in the 1960s, this balance between theory and experiment has shifted. Since then, theories typically predict new particle phenomena first, which are then sought to be confirmed by experiments tailored for this task. The discoveries of W and Z bosons and of higher generation quarks and leptons followed this pattern; the experimental discoveries of the Higgs boson and supersymmetry are current experimental goals, which would fall into the same category.​[2]​ Experiment thus regularly assumes the role of a testing device for already existing particle theories. 

Several of the points mentioned have parallels in the evolution of general relativity, which depicts the marginalisation of the phenomena as a general tendency in fundamental physics today. The question arises naturally, how empiricism, which emphasizes the distinctive status of visible phenomena in the context of scientific theories, is affected by this development. We will first have a look at instrumentalism as a backdrop for the ensuing analysis of constructive empiricism.


3: The Instrumentalist Case


	The instrumentalist rejects a literal interpretation of scientific theories and understands scientific objects as mere tools to structure the visible reality. While this interpretation of science may look fairly plausible in moderately theorized contexts, its application to more advanced theoretical schemes raises plausibility problems. The assumption looks little convincing, that the entire complex of elementary particles and gauge interactions has no meaning whatsoever beyond the shape of a bunch of small lines on a photo in Geneva or Chicago.​[3]​ The marginalisation of the phenomena certainly makes instrumentalism a less natural choice. It does not constitute an outright refutation of instrumentalism, however. The asserted implausibility of instrumentalism relies solely on unintuitive complexity, and science itself tells us that this type of implausibility can be notoriously misleading. The scientific statement that the complex structures of living organisms have evolved based on evolutionary random processes, to give one example, clearly does not pass any plausibility test. 
A more forceful plausibility argument against instrumentalism arises if one considers the limits of the visible regime in modern complex theories. The connection between microphysics and cosmology introduces new frontiers of the visible, whose identification with bounds of existence appears less plausible than in the classical cases. Most versions of instrumentalism uphold the claim that statements about the past can have a truth value. Now modern cosmology tells us that the universe evolves out of the so-called big bang and its early highly dense stages represent a world void of all macroscopic objects and remote from all classical physical conditions as we know them. The early universe thus does not allow direct visibility any more than microphysical processes today. The instrumentalist therefore is forced to deny ‘real existence’ to the early universe and consequently has to insert her own ‘ontological big bang’ to denote the point in time when the real world starts to exist. Everything before this point must be taken as a mere mathematical construction to structure the later evolution. Things start their existence ‘out of nothing’ just because any earlier evolution could not satisfy the visibility condition. While an instrumentalist distance scale limit to reality can be based on the immediate human experience of a visibility limit, the absence of any human being close to a posited primordial limit to ‘real time’ renders the latter artificial and unsatisfactory. The need to base an ontological distinction on theoretical considerations about the early universe that don’t have any connection with actual human observation clearly runs counter to the initial motivation of instrumentalism.
Unlike instrumentalism, CE does not deny a reality beyond the visible phenomena. Therefore, CE is in a decidedly better position than instrumentalism to deal with the questions raised above. The marginalisation of phenomena in particle physics does not affect the plausibility of CE’s epistemological claims; and what was a highly troublesome ontologically charged delimitation of the realm of the real on the time axis in the case of instrumentalism, in the context of CE turns into a comparably unproblematic limit to the human ability to identify truth about our past.​[4]​ 

	So far, the discussion has been led at a normative level. We were looking for an appropriate philosophical interpretation of scientific theories based on these theories’ structural characteristics. Instead of looking at scientific theories, however, we might also look at the scientists and discuss their scientific attitude: Which philosophical interpretation is compatible with the way scientists behave? What are scientists implicitly aiming at when they develop scientific theories and what do they implicitly impute to these theories? These questions do not address the manifest philosophical positions of scientists, which could be ascertained by handing out questionnaires. The scientist’s philosophical stance is based on many influences other than the scientific praxis and may not be compatible with the latter. The compatibility between the scientific praxis and a given philosophical position itself requires philosophical analysis. 
 One important aspect of the question of scientific attitude is the motivational question. A philosophical conception of science that is compatible with the scientific attitude must be able to explain why scientists are interested in the questions their theories try to answer. The marginalisation of phenomena makes this decidedly more difficult for empiricist positions. 
The remarkable observable implications and technical applications of theories like quantum mechanics clearly provide sufficient reason to focus on this kind of research. In the case of modern particle physics the opposite is true. Neither does particle physics have any technical applicability nor does it explain any specific visible phenomena that are per se significant or interesting. To concede that the enterprise of particle physics is justified means to accept justification from somewhere within the theoretical body of its theories, beyond the dry and minimalist phenomenological surface. It means to accept that we spend money and time to learn something about quarks, gauge bosons, the hot early universe or the big bang and not just about the weird pattern of lines on a photo. Particle physics by its very existence awards its scientific objects independent relevance. To adopt this attitude however bluntly contradicts the core claims of instrumentalism.
	Instrumentalism, therefore, by reducing the relevance of microphysical concepts to their visible effects, must miss the relevance of contemporary particle physics entirely. If taken seriously, it would imply severe criticism of the path of modern physics and would suggest withdrawing all support from the high energy physics research program. There do exist philosophers of science like Nancy Cartwright [Cartwright 1999] who, albeit based on different arguments, feel confident to give advice of that kind to scientific goal definition from a philosophical perspective. The more widespread attitude in philosophy of science is to avoid censuring scientific strategy choice. History knows many examples where philosophical attempts to prescribe to natural scientists how they should direct or carry out their science has ended with the embarrassment of the philosophical side. Natural science itself has regularly turned out to be the most effective guide of its own course. A kind of meta-induction therefore suggests taking the inability of instrumentalism to provide motivation for the currently ongoing high-energy physics research program as a more serious problem for instrumentalism than for particle physics.
	CE can build two lines of defence against the motivational threat that are not available to the instrumentalist. The first one, way out in the realist realm, is based on the fact that CE does not deny that statements about microphysical objects can be true. Therefore, it might be argued that CE, unlike instrumentalism, leaves some room for using the truth of microphysical theories as a source of motivation for developing these theories after all. This line of defence clearly lacks substance, however (and I do not think that anyone is actually interested in holding it). Though CE does not deny the possibility that microphysical theories can be true, it denies the possibility ever to assess the probability that this is the case for some specific theory. This is why CE denies that scientists aim at truth in the first place. If the nature of scientific theories does not provide a basis for aiming at truth, however, it cannot provide a basis either for motivating the construction of scientific theories by the fact that they might by chance be true after all.
The second line of defence lies closer to the home territory of empiricism. It might be argued that CE derives the motivation for theory construction from the quest for EA, just like scientific realism derives it from the quest for the truth about the micro-world. This suggestion may look fairly plausible at first glance. A closer analysis of its validity requires a discussion of some aspects of CE.


4: Norms and Attitudes

Van Fraassen claims that scientific theories aim at empirical adequacy (EA) instead of truth. EA is based on the totality of all empirical evidence possible and does not directly address the current empirical status quo. As [McMullin 2003] has pointed out, this is surprisingly ambitious for an antirealist approach. Several arguments might raise doubts whether EA in van Fraassen’s sense is a useful and workable concept. 
Antirealists, to begin with, may well doubt whether a specific theory that covers all possible evidence exists at all. If new empirical evidence were a never-ending stream that for all times required the creation of ever new theoretical concepts to be accounted for, no specific theory could be formulated that would satisfy the condition of EA. 
In order to state an extensional difference between EA and truth however, even more is required than the posit of the existence of a theory that covers all possible evidence: the difference between EA and truth is based on the assumption that there exist several or many theories that fulfil EA for a given exhaustive empirical data set. Unfortunately, this assumption can only be argued for based on the present theories, which at best fit the currently available data. The validity of such arguments in the case of the entirely unknown scenario of theories that fit all possible data must be considered doubtful. If EA were fulfilled by only one theory, however, it would become undistinguishable from truth and the concept of constructive empiricism would fall back on realism. 
In addition, EA seems to be no less vulnerable to the pessimistic meta-induction [Laudan 1981] than the concept of truth of scientific statements. If the pessimistic meta-induction establishes that we must expect our current theories to be proven untrue by future experiments, it equally establishes that we must expect them to be proven not to fulfil EA. EA thus seems to be just as over-ambitious a goal for science as truth. If one is willing to accept the constructive empiricist’s over-ambitious goal however, why should one criticize the scientific realist for the over-ambitious character of HER goal? 

Van Fraassen uses a subtle strategy to avoid the cited problems. His formulation of CE involves a delicate shift to the level of scientific attitude, which can be exemplified by the way CE is argued for in 2§3 in [van Fraassen 1980]. The author first introduces the realist’s claim that the assumption of real invisible objects which cause visible phenomena is an inference to the best explanation (IBE) from these phenomena: 

If we are to follow the same patterns of inference with respect to [the scientific realism debate] as we do in science itself, we shall find ourselves irrational unless we assert the truth of the scientific theories we accept.

This claim is made at a normative level. Then, by emphasising the psychological aspect of following a rule like the rule of IBE, he shifts the discussion to the level of scientific attitude where he places his suggestion:

We are always willing to believe that the theory which best explains the evidence, is empirically adequate.	

According to van Fraassen, neither the posit of invisible objects in scientific theories nor the empirical tests of the respective theories provide any basis for determining whether the involved scientists aim at truth or at EA. In this light it seems advisable to choose the less ambitious and less problematic concept of EA.
It is the non-normative character of CE’s pivotal claim that enables CE to exploit the advantages of empiricism over scientific realism in spite of the absolute notion of EA. The scientific realist is bound to make her assertions at the normative level. She intends to establish the objective core of scientific theories independently of the mindset of those theories’ exponents. For the scientific realist the quality of current scientific theories thus lies primarily in their factual similarity to the true theory. She remains chained to the final goal she attributes to science even when evaluating current scientific theories. This is her foremost problem, as the pessimistic meta-induction makes it very difficult to find any notion of similarity between current and true theory that is sufficiently strong to support a meaningful realism but at the same time sufficiently flexible to account for the observed dynamics of theory succession.
If van Fraassen’s claims remained at a normative level, he would not fare much better than the scientific realist. The normative version of his statement would be: we can never be confident that our scientific theories are true; all we can be confident of is that they are empirically adequate. This claim, however, would immediately run into the problems described above: we cannot check empirical adequacy either and it is questionable whether an empirically adequate theory exists at all.​[5]​ 
By shifting his claim to the level of scientific attitude, van Fraassen avoids these objections. Successful scientific theories can be called approximately empirically adequate as they fit the evidential status quo within specific error bars. Future empirical data may be expected to reveal the limits of the present theories’ empirical adequacy and to guide the search for new theoretical schemes. CE merely states that natural scientists who partake in the scientific process AIM at (absolute) EA and, at each stage, test the assumption that (absolute) EA has already been achieved. In this sense scientists are ‘willing to believe’ in the EA of the topical scientific theories, even though they must expect these theories to be falsified and superseded later on. EA plays the role of a symbolic endpoint of the succession of scientific theories that can be aimed at without being within reach. Scientists can follow it like sailors heading north can follow the North Star. 
The scientific justification strategies, however, remain based entirely on the current empirical status quo. Scientists are taken to build theories in order to describe and predict the visible world today. Argumentation at the level of scientific attitude thus opens the way back from the absolute quality of EA to a self-contained assessment of present scientific theories that does not rely on the validity of the absolute concept. This is why constructive empiricism remains fully empiricist in spirit and this is why it evades the problems typically faced by scientific realism. 

	The last paragraphs imply a clear verdict on the suggestion formulated at the end of section 3: The attempt to derive CE’s motivational force from EA must fail because CE does not make any normative statements about EA. It does not establish that knowledge about our present theories can tell us anything about the empirically adequate theories. That, however, would be a precondition for using EA to motivate the construction of our present theories. Scientific realism tries to motivate theory construction by the claim that our present theories tell us something about the true theories, even though they are not entirely true themselves. The realist faces the problem to explain what precisely it is they can tell. CE does not even claim to provide the basis for assertions about the empirically adequate theories. Therefore, it forsakes EA’s potential role as a motivational source for theory construction from the start. The retreat to the level of scientific attitude in this light turns out to be decidedly more damaging to CE’s ability to explain theory motivation in particle physics than the retreat to EA itself. If EA were introduced in the context of a normative version of CE, it would be powerful enough to serve as a motivational basis for science. Just because CE, for good reasons, remains at the level of scientific attitude, the motivational basis for the particle physics research program lies beyond its reach.
	The emphasis on the question of scientific attitude does not merely prevent remedies for the motivational problem, however. It actually makes the problem significantly more threatening. The motivational objection against instrumentalism was an objection from the outside. Instrumentalism is defined by a normative statement about the relation between scientific theory and the world and can be analysed without touching questions of scientific motivation. If instrumentalism cannot explain why physicists invest so much money and manpower in the exploration of high-energy physics, this may be taken as a serious drawback for the position’s credibility but it does not render the position incoherent. CE, to the contrary, is explicitly based on the claim to construe the scientists’ attitude in a way that is compatible with their actions. If the concept is not able to fulfil this claim, it fails as a whole. The marginalisation of the phenomena thus threatens the core of CE.


5: Truth and Prediction

It is instructive to look at the situation from a slightly different angle. EA, as used by van Fraassen, denotes full agreement with all empirical evidence that can be acquired in principle by a human being with today’s physical capacities. To demonstrate how delicately the general viability of CE relies on the specific details of this definition, we want to test a slightly modified notion of empirical adequacy, EA(+), that is not based on all humanely possible observations but on all observations open to humans from now on. This modification separates EA(+) from truth extensionally in statements about past observable objects. 
	Let us examine the example of palaeontologists who try to reconstruct dinosaurs from excavated bones. Their theories are concerned with the physiology and the behaviour of the dinosaurs whose bones have been found. They strive to develop complete theories that give full descriptions of those qualities for specific dinosaur species. Let us imagine the discovery of a dinosaur tooth that does not fit to any of the known dinosaur species. It might well be that this tooth is the only remaining part of its dinosaur species still existent on earth so that man will never get more information about that species than what is contained in the discovered tooth. A theory about the concerned dinosaur that is compatible with the tooth itself therefore is a reasonable candidate for a theory that satisfies EA(+). If science aimed at EA(+), the construction of any such theory would be scientifically desirable. It is clear, however, that a theory that conjectures the entire physiology and behaviour of a dinosaur based on one tooth would be mostly arbitrary and its construction therefore would not be considered scientifically justified. Such a theory would be so dramatically underdetermined by the evidence that most of its claims, though possibly EA(+), would most likely be false.​[6]​ Science in this context does NOT aim at EA(+) but at truth. Palaeontologists distinguish carefully between the two by assessing the degree of underdetermination of a theory by the empirical data. 
EA(+) thus fails to be a reasonable replacement of truth as the purported aim of science. Van Fraassen’s EA is in a better situation since it resembles truth extensionally for all statements about observable objects, including dinosaurs. The close similarity between EA and EA(+) nevertheless provokes two interrelated questions: Why should it be plausible to assume that an assessment of the degree of underdetermination (which comes up to assessing the likelihood of truth) lies beyond the aims of scientific theories dealing with unobservable objects, if it so clearly constitutes a crucial part of science in theories about observable objects like dinosaurs? And why should science aim at EA if it is clearly not interested in EA’s close relative EA(+)?
 An attempt to answer both questions must be based on the differences that distinguish a scientific field like palaeontology from those scientific fields which constitute the classic examples for the use of invisible objects. The evaluation of scientific theories of the latter kind is crucially based on the theories’ predictive power. Palaeontology, to the contrary, precisely because it deals with bygone observable objects and therefore highlights the difference between EA(+) and EA, cannot easily base its justification on viable predictions. This suggests that only those scientific disciplines, whose predictive power does not play a central role in motivating theory construction, must fall back on judging their theories’ value based on an assessment of the latter’s degree of underdetermination. Highly predictive theories derive their value mainly from their predictive quality and thus don’t have to meddle with the question of underdetermination. As a matter of fact, theories like quantum mechanics would run into serious problems if they had to address the issue of underdetermination, since the counterintuitive properties of microphysical objects seem to remove the stable foundation of existence claims.​[7]​ An assessment of the degree of underdetermination therefore is far more difficult to achieve in the context of invisible objects than in theories about dinosaurs, where one can rely on the assumption that the set of potentially viable theories does not transgress the set of theories based on our intuitive notion of heads, legs or tails. Physics and palaeontology choose substantially different kinds of scientific credentials in dependence on the chances to vindicate them within their respective scientific context.
The validity of EA as the aim of scientific theories, if it can prevail, thus relies on a careful fine-tuning of EA’s definition in order to cover the various quite distinct contexts of scientific research. In both of the contexts discussed above, palaeontology and quantum physics, EA seems to work as an aim for science. However, it works for quite different reasons in each case. In the case of palaeontology, the strong emphasis on the assessment of the theory’s underdetermination by the available empirical evidence strongly suggests that scientists aim at truth. EA evades problems because every theory about visible objects that fulfils EA is true by definition. Quantum physics, on the other hand, shows a strong emphasis on experimental tests and the theories’ predictive qualities. If a theory gives correct predictions, the question of its underdetermination by experimental data does not play an important role in its scientific appraisal. This in fact suggests, in accordance with CE, that quantum physicists do not primarily aim at truth. 
Given the reasons why CE works in the two discussed cases, it is rather straightforward, however, to trace out possible types of scientific theory building where CE is in serious danger to fail. Let us imagine a scientific field that involves invisible objects but either (a) cannot base the scientific testing of its theories on their predictive force or (b) cannot take predictive force as the primary reason for the theories’ relevance. In both cases, theory evaluation would lack the arguments deployed in the context of quantum mechanics and therefore would have to resort to strategies similar to those which destroy the viability of EA(+) as a guiding principle in the case of palaeontology. 





CE’s inability to take into account the new characteristics of elementary particle physics per se does not invalidate the arguments that have led to CE’s construction. At first sight, both main arguments seem to remain intact in particle physics. A satisfactory realist conception of scientific objects is at least as difficult to find in the context of topical particle physics as in simple quantum mechanics. The problems of an interpretation of scientific theory evaluation in terms of the quest for truth don’t disappear either. Just like in any other field of physics, correct empirical predictions in particle physics are taken as theory confirmation regardless of considerations about underdetermination.
Still, particle physics may indeed offer a constructive new perspective on the scientific realism debate. Five points were listed in section 4 to characterize the marginalisation of the phenomena. While the first four points provided the basis for the argumentation against empiricism, point five might actually indicate where to go from there. The fact that theory-building was able to guide scientific progress in particle physics during the last decades is related to the strong tendency of particle theories to predict genuinely new physical phenomena based on theoretical consistency arguments. Though theoretical predictions of genuinely new physical phenomena were always part of the scientific process, the extent to which such predictions have assumed the role of the driving force of scientific progress in particle physics is quite unusual. The construction of the particle physics standard model was instigated solely by a theoretical consistency problem and turned out to provide correct predictions of a whole array of new particles. Success stories like this would look like miracles if the theoretical consistency problems solved by the respective theories allowed many alternative theoretical solutions which would have been scientifically satisfactory as well but would have predicted entirely different new phenomena​[8]​. In this light, it seems plausible to assume a subtle connection between a theory’s power to predict new phenomena correctly and the degree of underdetermination of scientific theory-building at the given point. A pattern of successful theoretical predictions of new phenomena seems to reveal a scarcity of theoretical options that establishes limitations on scientific underdetermination. In this sense, an experiment which tests a theory’s capability to predict new phenomena comes close to being a test of scientific underdetermination. One main argument for CE, the lack of concern for the question of underdetermination in exact sciences, comes under threat.
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^1	  String theory, a physical field that flourishes without any empirical confirmation, raises interesting philosophical questions of its own and may be understood as a further step in the process of the marginalisation of the phenomena. In the present article however the focus will remain on experimentally tested particle physics.
^2	  This should only be taken as a tendency, not an iron rule. Not all testable properties are predicted by particle experiments. The test of proton decay would be one example where experiment still sets the pace and theory follows.
^3	  Geneva and Chicago are the locations of the two high-energy collider experiments today.
^4	  The general question how to define the limit between the visible and the invisible not directly related to the topic of highly advanced theory and won’t be addressed here. 
^5	  In a way such a claim of EA would be more daring than scientific realism. The scientific realist argues that there are abstract arguments like the no miracles argument which support the assumption that our theories to some extent resemble a true theory. A normative version of constructive empiricism would reject these arguments and would have to posit EA without argumentative support.
^6	  Of course one can deny the relevance of the statement that the theory has chances to be EA(+) on Popperian grounds by pointing out that EA(+) can only be expected to apply under the condition that many aspects of the theory are de facto not experimentally falsifiable, which would render the theory’s claims unscientific. This, however, already presupposes an answer to the fundamental question we face in the present context: In which cases can underdetermination be considered an acceptable characteristic of a scientific theory and in which cases does it destroy the theory’s scientific value?  
^7	  McMullin 2003 suggests that the plausibility of constructive empiricism is far more dependent on questions of micro-ontology than its exponents are willing to admit.
^8	  The use of the phrase “entirely different new phenomena” requires some specification. The particle physics standard model does allow empirically non-equivalent extensions. Those predictions of new particles, however, which are implied by the concepts deployed to solve the crucial conceptual problems the standard model was built to solve,  remain the same in all these extensions.  
^9	  The issue of the reduction of scientific underdetermination plays a more central role in the context of string theory, an empirically unconfirmed conceptual successor of point-like particle physics (see [Dawid 2003], [Dawid 2004]). String theory also suggests a new perspective on the distinction between truth and EA. The search for a new position in the scientific realism debate thus may profit from a comparison between the general situation in particle physics and the situation in string physics.
